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Opportunity Zones Providing 
Opportunity for Whom?:  How the 
Current Regulations Are Failing and a 
Solution to Uplift Communities 
Ruta R. Trivedi* 
Abstract 
In 2017, the newly enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created an 
incentive for taxpayers to invest in Qualified Opportunity Zones—
census tracts that consist of low-income communities. These 
investments, which are incentivized via lucrative tax deferral 
benefits, are intended to uplift communities and leave them in a 
better position than they were pre-investment. However, the 
initiative lacks regulation requiring investments to actually benefit 
low-income areas, resulting in money going to places that do not 
need help, while communities that are in need may face 
displacement. This is a result of many wealthy investors finding 
that luxury projects are the easiest to finance, while others have 
even lobbied to have state officials designate specific plots of lands, 
that are not low-income at all, as Opportunity Zones. This Note 
explores how the Opportunity Zone legislation contributes to the 
pervasive income and wealth disparities in America and proposes 
additional regulations that could result in meaningful investments 
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OPPORTUNITY ZONES 747 
“Those are pretty sweet set ups—real cap gains advantages.” 
“The tax breaks are supposed to be for the benefit of downtrodden 
neighborhoods to stimulate investment development.” 
“And treadmills were originally built as a system of punishment 
for convicts—hard labor—milling grain, not firm-bunned soccer 
moms.”1 
I. Introduction 
Throughout the United States, income inequality has grown 
markedly.2 America’s top 10% earners now average an annual 
income that is more than nine times as much as those in the 
remaining 90%.3 A key factor contributing to the income and 
wealth disparity is the preferential tax treatment of long-term 
capital gains.4 For instance, “[t]he higher the income group. . . the 
larger the share of income derived from investment profits.”5 
Conversely, Americans who are not in the highest income tax 
bracket receive the majority of their income from wages and 
salaries.6 As such, this preferential tax treatment of long-term 
capital gains facilitates the wealthy’s becoming even wealthier and 
 
 1. Billions:  Opportunity Zone (SHOWTIME television broadcast May 24, 
2020). 
 2. See generally Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi, Arloc Sherman, & Jennifer 
Beltrán, A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-
inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality (last 
updated Jan. 13, 2020) (highlighting broad trends and the widening inequality in 
income over the past seven decades) [perma.cc/YQF8-2EVR]. 
 3. See generally Income Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG,  
https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/ (detailing the large disparity in 
annual income between those in the top 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% as compared to 
those in the bottom 90%) [perma.cc/R8WY-LCSK]. 
 4. See id. (explaining that the top marginal tax rate for the richest 
Americans in the highest tax bracket is 37%, while the highest rate that applies 
to long-term capital gains is 20%). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. (noting that between 2009 and 2018, the bottom 90% had wage 
and salary income growth of 6.8%, compared to 19.2% for the top 0.1% earners). 
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is a factor that contributes to the exacerbation of the disparity in 
both the income and wealth gap.7  
In December of 2017, Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act.8 The Act introduced incentives for investors to invest in areas 
designated as “Opportunity Zones.”9 Qualified Opportunity Zones 
are population census tracts that consist of low-income 
communities that have been nominated and designated as such 
according to a specific procedure.10 States may nominate an area 
to be an Opportunity Zone, which must then be certified by the 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.11 
The objective in enacting Opportunity Zones was to spur 
economic development in these low-income communities.12 
Investors are incentivized to invest in the zones by receiving tax 
benefits provided by deferred taxation of their earnings.13 In order 
to invest in an Opportunity Zone, investors must have unrealized 
 
 7. See Wealth Inequality in the United States, INEQUALITY.ORG, 
https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality/ (defining wealth as a 
representation of a person’s net worth, in other words, the sum of an individual’s 
total assets minus liabilities, and that wealth inequality is more pervasive than 
income inequality in America) [perma.cc/5W5U-D59V]. 
 8. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (Dec. 22, 2017). 
 9. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (implementing the new legislation that 
allows taxpayers to defer taxes if they reinvest capital gains in an area designated 
a qualified Opportunity Zone). 
 10. See id. (defining low-income community as a population census tract with 
a poverty rate of at least 20% or, in the case that the tract is not within a 
metropolitan area—the median family income of the tract does not exceed 80% of 
statewide median family income). 
 11. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b) (2018) (stating that the chief executive officer of 
the state in which the tract is located may nominate a zone for qualification). 
 12. See Investing in Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,897 (Jan. 13, 
2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“In developing the proposed 
regulations . . . the Treasury Department and the IRS intended to strike a 
balance between providing taxpayers with a flexible and efficient process for 
organizing QOFs, while ensuring that investments in such vehicles will be 
properly directed toward the economic development of low-income 
communities.”). 
 13. See The Power of Tax Deferral, Why it May Pay to Delay, GOLDMAN 
SACHS, https://www.gsam.com/content/dam/gsam/pdfs/us/en/advisor-
resources/sales-library/variable-annuity/power-of-tax-deferral.pdf?sa=n&rd=n 
(Feb. 28, 2018) (“The power of tax deferral is straightforward: [P]ostponing taxes 
on any earnings generated within your investment portfolio can allow more of 
your investment returns to compound over time, resulting in potentially higher 
long-term returns.”) [perma.cc/FT4L-GRTS]. 
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capital gains from the sale of a capital asset.14 These gains can then 
be rolled into a Qualified Opportunity Fund (QOF), which is a 
vehicle used to invest in an Opportunity Zone.15 Investors may:  
(1) Defer taxation on any prior gains invested in a QOF until the 
earlier of either the date on which the investment in a QOF is sold 
or exchanged, or December 31, 2026; (2) receive a 10% exclusion of 
the deferred gain if the QOF investment is held for longer than five 
years; (3) receive a 15% exclusion of the deferred gain if the QOF 
investment is held for longer than seven years; and (4) if the 
investor holds the investment in the Opportunity Fund for at least 
ten years, they become eligible for an increase in the basis of the 
QOF investment equal to its fair market value on the date that the 
QOF investment is sold or exchanged.16 Thus, the tax treatment of 
Opportunity Zone investments is far more preferential than the 
already preferential treatment of taxes on capital gains.17 
Generally, capital gains are profits from the sale of a capital 
asset.18 “Capital assets are significant pieces of property such as 
homes, cars, investment properties, stocks, bonds, and even 
collectibles or art.”19 When a capital asset is sold, the difference 
between the adjusted basis in the asset and the amount realized 
from the sale of the asset is classified as a capital gain or loss.20 A 
 
 14. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018) (providing a tax deferral for capital gains 
reinvested in Opportunity Zones). 
 15. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d) (2018) (defining a “qualified opportunity fund” as 
an investment vehicle organized as a corporation or partnership for the purposes 
of investing in qualified Opportunity Zone property). 
 16. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018) (providing the logistics and tax consequences 
of investing in an area designated an Opportunity Zone). 
 17. Compare I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018) (explaining the permissible tax 
deferrals on gains from investments in Opportunity Zones), with I.R.C. § 1(h) 
(2018) (providing that the capital gains tax rates will generally be between 0% 
and 20% depending on the taxpayer’s income tax bracket). 
 18. See I.R.C. § 1221 (2018) (defining capital assets as property held by the 
taxpayer with certain exclusions for property used in the individual’s trade or 
business that is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, 
or real property used in their trade or business); I.R.C. § 1222 (2018) (defining 
other terms related to capital gains and losses). 
 19. Alicia Tuovila, Capital Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalasset.asp (last updated Nov. 12, 
2020) [perma.cc/29HY-VA6U]. 
 20. See Topic No. 409, Capital Gains and Losses, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 (last updated Jan. 19, 2021) (defining the 
asset’s basis generally as its cost to its owner) [perma.cc/6TCP-DHQX]. 
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capital gain results when “you sell the [capital] asset for more than 
your adjusted basis.”21 A capital loss results if “you sell the [capital] 
asset for less than your adjusted basis.”22 Furthermore, capital 
gains and losses are classified as long-term or short-term.23 Lower 
tax rates generally apply to long-term capital gains versus 
ordinary income.24 For most individuals, the tax rate on capital 
gains is no higher than 15%, however, for very high-income 
individuals this preferential rate is higher.25 Thus, the tax 
treatment of Opportunity Zone investments is far more 
preferential than the already preferential treatment of taxes on 
capital gains.26 
Areas designated as Opportunity Zones are intended to be 
regions that have lower income levels, higher poverty rates, and 
higher unemployment rates than eligible non-designated tracts.27 
However, where communities are already experiencing high levels 
of socioeconomic change, further investment could possibly 
displace low and moderate income residents.28 Policy analysts have 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. (“Generally, if you hold the asset for more than one year before 
you dispose of it, your capital gain or loss is long-term. If you hold it one year or 
less, your capital gain or loss is short-term.”). 
 24. See id. (explaining that there are a few exceptions in which case capital 
gains may be taxed at rates higher than 20%). 
 25. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018) (providing that for individuals whose income is 
$0 to $39,375, the long-term capital gains tax rate is 0%, for those who earn 
$39,376 to $434,550 it is 15%, and for those earning over $434,551 it is 20%). 
 26. Compare I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018) (explaining the permissible tax 
deferrals on gains from investments in Opportunity Zones), with I.R.C. § 1(h) 
(2018) (providing that the capital gains tax rates will generally be between 0% 
and 20% depending on the taxpayer’s income tax bracket). 
 27. See What are Opportunity Zones and How Do They Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/what-are-opportunity-zones-and-how-do-they-work (last updated May 2020) 
(answering frequently asked questions pertaining to how to invest in Opportunity 
Zones and how the zones function as a tax break incentive) [perma.cc/RAR3-
JTBV]; Investing in Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,901 (Jan. 13, 2020) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“In particular, the Treasury Department and 
the IRS note that section 1400Z-2 was enacted to encourage the development of 
operating businesses in QOZs and thereby increase the economic development of 
the communities located in those designated census tracts.”). 
 28. See TAX POL’Y CTR. URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., supra note 27 
(indicating that Opportunity Zones in those areas may be less likely to benefit 
low-income residents). 
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expressed concerns that Opportunity Zones in these areas may 
inadvertently exacerbate the problem of unemployment and 
poverty in these tracts.29 Because the period of investment in order 
to benefit from deferred capital gains taxes is five, seven, or ten 
years, the economic growth in the Opportunity Zones could be 
temporary, and could ultimately leave areas in a more destitute 
position than they were before.30  
Additionally, there is concern about whether the designation 
process is appropriate to lift low-income communities.31 Section 
1400Z includes no requirement that local residents and businesses 
actually benefit from these investments.32 “Even supporters of the 
initiative agree that the bulk of the opportunity-zone money is 
going to places that do not need the help, while many poorer 
communities are left empty-handed.”33 Over 200 of the 8,800 
federally designated Opportunity Zones are adjacent to poor areas 
but are not themselves considered low income.34 “Backers of the 
 
 29. See id. (finding that designated zones have “lower incomes, higher 
poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates than eligible non-designated 
tracts”). 
 30. See Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Looms, As 
Do Risks of Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 
11, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-
opportunity-zones-loom-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax (providing examples of 
luxurious investment projects in Oakland and New York that are being selected 
for their financial return, not their social impact resulting in accelerated 
gentrification, dislocation of current residents, and few jobs created) 
[perma.cc/L7MA-36SF]. 
 31. See Scott Eastman & Nicole Kaeding, Opportunity Zones:  What We Know 
and What We Don’t, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://taxfoundation.org/opportunity-zones-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/ 
(“While opportunity zones present certain budgetary and economic costs, it is 
unclear whether opportunity zone tax preferences used to attract investment will 
actually benefit distressed communities.”) [perma.cc/W9Y6-SNL4]. 
 32. See Adam Looney, Will Opportunity Zones Help Distressed Residents or 
be a Tax Cut for Gentrification?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-help-
distressed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification/ (“It’s a subsidy based on 
capital appreciation, not on employment or local services, and includes no 
provisions intended to retain local residents or promote inclusive housing.”) 
[perma.cc/2AHZ-6ZQR]. 
 33. See Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, Meant to Lift Poor Areas, Tax Break Is 
Boon to Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2019) (reporting that some Opportunity Zones 
that were classified as low-income based on census data from several years ago 
have since gentrified). 
 34. See id. (stating that up to 5% of the zones need not be poor in order to 
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program say that luxury projects are the easiest to finance, which 
is why those have been happening first.”35 In some cases, 
developers have lobbied state officials to include specific plots of 
land inside Opportunity Zones that are not low-income at all.36 
One example of such lobbying or perceived influence is 
illustrated by billionaire Richard LeFrak.37 “Developer Richard 
LeFrak, one of the president’s buddies from his New York real 
estate days, appears to have given [Donald Trump’s inaugural 
committee] $150,000.”38 LeFrak is working on a 183-acre project 
set to include twelve residential towers and eight football fields’ 
worth of retail and commercial space in Miami.39 LeFrak’s team 
encouraged city officials to nominate the area around the site as 
 
enable governors to draw zones in ways that would include projects or businesses 
just outside poor census tracts, potentially creating jobs for low-income people).  
 35. See id. (noting that some proponents of the program hope that luxury 
project deals will be eclipsed by ones that produce social benefits in low-income 
areas).  
 36. See Justin Elliot, Jeff Ernsthausen & Kyle Edwards, A Trump Tax Break 
to Help the Poor Went to a Rich GOP Donor’s Superyacht Marina, PROPUBLICA 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-
palm-beach-opportunity-zone-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-
gop-donor (reporting that Wayne Huizenga Jr., owner of West Palm Beach 
Rybovich superyacht marina and son of billionaire Wayne Huizenga Sr., 
successfully appealed directly to then-governor Rick Scott to have the census tract 
encapsulating the marina nominated as an Opportunity Zone, as he long planned 
building luxury apartments there) [perma.cc/XH2U-BXW2]; Letter from H. 
Wayne Huizenga, Jr. to Governor Rick Scott (Apr. 10, 2018), available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6531609/Rybovich-Support-Ltr-
WPB-Opportunity-Zones.pdf (writing to submit three eligible census tracts as 
Opportunity Zones “in order to take advantage of the significant private sector 
investment . . . poised to take place” and noting that a $120 million residential 
building, that incorporates the Rybovich marina, has been planned for some 
time). 
 37. See Dan Alexander & Chase Peterson-Withorn, More than 25 
Billionaires Poured Millions Into Trump’s Inaugural Committee, FORBES (Apr. 19, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2017/04/19/more-than-25-
billionaires-poured-millions-into-trumps-inaugural-committee/#3bc9c1a3cb33 
(detailing who several of the greatest contributions to the Trump campaign and 
inauguration came from, many of whom are close friends of the President) 
[perma.cc/L3ZG-8KUU]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33, at 19 (“The tax break is largely 
benefiting the real estate industry—where Mr. Trump made his fortune and still 
has extensive business interests—and it is luring people with personal or 
professional connections to the president.”). 
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an Opportunity Zone in 2018, and the Treasury Department has 
since made the designation official.40 It is these types of lobbying 
practices and the designations that result from them that need to 
be regulated more closely. 
Since the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act legislation of 2017 was 
enacted, additional guidance on section 1400Z is needed. In 
December 2019, the Department of Treasury issued final 
regulations providing guidance for taxpayers who may elect the 
federal income tax benefits provided by section 1400Z-2.41 This was 
followed by a series of proposed regulations related to QOFs and a 
notice and comment process that included public hearings.42 While 
the final regulations clarify certain logistics such as the timing of 
investing and treatment of eligible gains, they do not provide any 
additional requirements or clarity regarding what kind of 
businesses or investment vehicles should be used or a requirement 
that local residents be employed in the expansion or creation of 
such businesses.43 Taxpayers are currently able to move forward 
with the investments, but the question remains whether the 
incentives will benefit affected areas and their residents in the long 
term.44 
 
 40. See id. (detailing that along with Richard LeFrak, among those who have 
invested or intend to are Steve Case, co-founder of AOL; Chris Christie, a 
one-time adviser to trump and former governor of New Jersey; and Cadre, an 
investment company co-founded by Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law).  
 41. See generally Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 
1,866 (Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (explaining the regulation 
governs “the extent to which taxpayers may elect the Federal income tax benefits 
provided by section 1400Z-2 of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to certain 
equity interests in a qualified opportunity fund”.). 
 42. See REGULATIONS.GOV, 29 Search Results for qualified opportunity funds, 
https://www.regulations.gov/searchResults?rpp=25&po=0&s=%22qualified%2Bo
pportunity%2Bfunds%22&fp=true&ns=true (listing 29 results for legislation 
activity related to qualified opportunity funds) [perma.cc/W8NH-EXRH]. 
 43. See id. (providing additional incentives for investors to roll capital gains 
into Opportunity Zones without creating requirements for employment or 
education purposes). 
 44. See Angeline Rice & David Sobochan, IRS Issues Second Set of Proposed 
Regulations on Opportunity Zones, THE TAX ADVISER (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/aug/irs-regs-opportunity-zones.html 
(providing clarity as to the additional regulations that were issued, none of which 
addressed socioeconomic concerns, and noting that many questions remained 
unanswered) [perma.cc/4S7M-4XZZ]. 
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This Note proposes additional regulations on Opportunity 
Zones, including greater state regulation. It proposes that the 
types of investments allowed in designated Opportunity Zones 
should be limited in order to prevent the program from serving as 
a legislative loophole that provides a vehicle for wealthy investors 
to defer tax payments on investments that are already receiving 
preferential treatment. Instead, the investments in those areas 
should be serving the members of the community whom the 
regulations were initially designed to benefit. 
Part II of this Note provides a background on income and 
wealth disparity in America, how capital gains tax rates promote 
investment, and the role these preferential tax rates play in the 
Opportunity Zone legislation. It also explains the process by which 
areas are nominated and designated as Opportunity Zones. 
Part III explores concerns with the Opportunity Zone 
programs. It describes the way that the legislation favors 
America’s wealthiest investors by outlining problematic ways in 
which some individuals are gaming the program to their 
advantage to become even wealthier. Part III also analogizes the 
Opportunity Zone program to the previously enacted New Markets 
Tax Incentive and Empowerment Zone programs and explores the 
ways in which Opportunity Zones may have a similar outcome and 
effect on economically distressed areas. 
Part IV discusses the detrimental consequences residents and 
businesses in low-income areas may face as a result of the 
Opportunity Zone program. It details how investors funneling 
money into already affluent areas will not benefit the intended 
beneficiaries of the initiative and could instead do the exact 
opposite of its stated mission. 
Part V suggests how administrative change at the state level 
could benefit the intended beneficiaries of Opportunity Zones by 
altering the kinds of investments that should be permitted. It 
provides examples from various states that have already adopted 
changes in light of the regulations and suggests that residents of 
the designated tracts be prioritized by the program’s regulatory 
structure and given opportunities for employment in the creation 
and expansion of investment businesses. It further analogizes 
changes made following the New Markets Tax Incentive and 
Empowerment Zone programs, which were beneficial to 
low-income communities and suggests how supplementary 
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Opportunity Zone regulations should be crafted in a similar 
manner. If implemented, the changes suggested in Part V could 
benefit the intended beneficiaries of the Opportunity Zone 
legislation, lift low-income areas and residents out of poverty, 
create jobs, and help address the wealth and income disparity 
present in the United States. 
II. Background 
A. How Tax Policies Can Further Income Inequality in America 
Income includes revenue streams from wages, salaries, 
interest on savings accounts, dividends from shares of stock, rent, 
and profits from selling goods at a higher price than they were 
purchased for.45 Income inequality refers to the extreme disparity 
of income distributions, with a high concentration of income 
usually in the hands of a small percentage of a population.46 The 
United States has the highest rate of income inequality of all 
Western countries.47 The U.N. Human Rights Council Report of the 
Special Rapporteur reported that: 
The United States has one of the highest poverty and inequality 
levels among the OECD countries, and the Stanford Center on 
Inequality and Poverty ranks it 18th out of 21 wealthy countries 
in terms of labour markets, poverty rates, safety nets, wealth 
inequality and economic mobility. But in 2018 the United 
States had over 25 per cent of the world’s 2,208 billionaires. 
There is thus a dramatic contrast between the immense wealth 
of the few and the squalor and deprivation in which vast 
 
 45. See Income Inequality in the United States, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. 
https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/#income-inequality (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2020) (defining income and providing an overview of the disparity 
between those earners in the top 1% income tax bracket and the rest of the 
population in the United States) [perma.cc/3VFZ-8A9Z]. 
 46. See id. (providing an overview of the disparity between those earners in 
the top 1% income tax bracket and the rest of the population in the United States). 
 47. See U.N. Secretariat, Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights on his Mission to the United States of America) Hum. 
Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33/Add.1 at 4 (May 4, 2018) (reporting further 
that the $1.5 trillion in tax cuts in December 2017 “overwhelmingly benefited the 
wealthy and worsened inequality”). 
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numbers of Americans exist.48 
Income inequality fuels a related phenomenon:  Wealth 
inequality.49 Wealth is measured by the difference in the value of 
a household or individual’s assets and liabilities (assets being 
things a family owns—financial and nonfinancial—such as bank 
accounts, stocks, real estate, cars, or homes).50 Liabilities, on the 
other hand, are debts which include mortgages, credit card 
balances, and other loans.51 Wealth is significantly concentrated in 
the top 1% of the population—between 1989 and 2016 the wealth 
share of the top 1% of the population increased from about 30% to 
about 40%.52 “Put a different way, a family at the 95th percentile 
of the wealth distribution had twenty-three times the wealth of a 
family at the middle, who in turn had more than nine times that 
of families at the 25th percentile.”53 
While for the vast majority of Americans income derives from 
wages, salaries, and other forms of labor compensation, the 
ultra-rich are the exception to this norm.54 For households that 
 
 48. Id.  
 49. See BRIAN KEELEY, OECD INSIGHTS, INCOME INEQUALITY:  THE GAP 
BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 71 (2015) (“Rising inequality may also skew an economy 
in ways that reduce overall middle-class demand for consumer goods or even fuel 
debt crises. For example, high earners may have a lot of surplus wealth that they 
need to find ways to invest.”). 
 50. See Greg Leiserson, Will McGrew & Raksha Kopparam, The Distribution 
of Wealth in the United States and Implications for a Net Worth Tax, WASH. CTR. 
FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 21, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/the-
distribution-of-wealth-in-the-united-states-and-implications-for-a-net-worth-tax/ 
(“The high level of wealth inequality in the United States also is reflected in the 
substantial difference between median wealth ($97,000) and mean wealth 
($690,000).”) [perma.cc/JUW7-9H6B]. 
 51. See id. (defining liabilities and explaining that the growing disparity in 
wealth and income inequality has “spurred increased interest in policy 
instruments that can combat inequality”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Fabian T. Pfeffer & Robert F. Schoeni, How Wealth Inequality 
Shapes Our Future, 2 RSF:  THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. OF THE SOC. SCI., no. 6, 
2016, at 10 (emphasis added) (detailing how wealth distributions have changed 
in American households between the years 1984 and 2015 and reporting that 
median wealth in 2013 was $81,400 and 12.9% of households had no wealth or 
were in debt). 
 54. See Philip Stallworth, “Let Me Tell You About the Very Rich. They are 
Different from You and Me.”, TAX POL’Y CTR. URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 
18. 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/let-me-tell-you-about-very-
rich-they-are-different-you-and-me (reporting that those who fall within the 
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make $25,000 or less per year, labor income accounts for 
approximately 50% of total income, and government assistance 
accounts for approximately one third.55 For the remaining income 
groups, 60% or more of yearly income is accounted for by wages, 
salaries, and employment-related benefits.56 For those who make 
up the top 0.1%, (those earning an annual income of $3.4 million 
or more), more than 50% of household income is derived from 
interest, dividends, and capital gains while only 25% of income is 
derived from wages and benefits.57 
In 2016, 80.4% of the wealth of the top 1% consisted of 
financial assets such as corporate stock, financial securities, 
mutual funds, interests in personal trusts, and ownership 
interests in unincorporated businesses.58 Yet, only 7% of people in 
the United States reported taxable capital gains, with nearly 
two-thirds of that income being reported by people with a total 
annual household income of $1 million or more.59 At the same time, 
the United States struggles with extreme poverty and 
commentators note that this poverty persists in part due to policy 
design choices.60 “At the end of the day, however, particularly in a 
 
exception to this norm are the highest 1% income earners, those who make 
$783,000 or more annually and whose income is split equally between income 
derived from capital and labor) [perma.cc/ZQY2-7YL8]. 
 55. See id. (“These differences in sources of income matters for policymakers 
hoping to use the tax code to reduce income inequality.”). 
 56. See id. (noting that this data is depictive of the shares of income sources 
within each income group, not how specific individuals within the groups actually 
earn their income). 
 57. See id. (emphasis added) (describing how the top 0.1% earn most of their 
annual income from sources that receive preferential tax treatment, resulting in 
a smaller proportion of earnings being paid in taxes than if all of their income was 
derived from wages). 
 58. See Alexandra Thornton & Galen Hendricks, Ending Special Tax 
Treatment for the Very Wealthy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 4, 2019, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/06/04/470621/en
ding-special-tax-treatment-wealthy/ (explaining that the disparities in income 
are dwarfed by disparities in wealth and that the value of such financial assets 
has grown significantly over time) [perma.cc/3YZZ-TPNX]. 
 59. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33, at 18 (“Yet this is a vital 
constituency, since the success of the Opportunity Zone program will hinge 
largely on how much money investors kick in.”). 
 60. See Alston, supra note 47, at 4 
For almost five decades the overall policy response has been neglectful 
at best, but the policies pursued over the past year seem deliberately 
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rich country like the United States, the persistence of extreme 
poverty is a political choice made by those in power.”61 
Trends in the United States tax regime suggest that tax policy 
has been geared toward enabling the small percentage of 
extremely wealthy Americans to become even wealthier.62 
Structural changes in the tax code favoring wealthy individuals 
occurred over the same period of time that income and wealth 
inequality grew.63 In the late 1980s, the top marginal income tax 
rate dropped well below 50% and today stands at 37%.64 The Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act, enacted in December 2017, was a boon to 
wealthy Americans despite receiving public opposition to the tax 
cuts for the wealthy.65 Today, a person who earns $650,000 pays 
the same top marginal tax rate as one who earns $10 million, but 
this has not always been the case.66 For decades following the 
 
designed to remove basic protections from the poorest, punish those 
who are not in employment and make even basic health care into a 
privilege to be earned rather than a right of citizenship. 
 61. Id.  
 62. See Warren E. Buffett, Opinion, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at 21 (“[W]hile most Americans struggle to make ends meet, 
we mega-rich continue to get our extraordinary tax breaks. These and other 
blessings are showered upon us by legislators in Washington who feel compelled 
to protect us . . . . It’s nice to have friends in high places”).  
 63. See Thornton & Hendricks, supra note 58 (providing an overview of how 
the United States’ tax policy favors the extremely wealthy and ways in which this 
can be corrected to close the wealth gap).  
 64. See Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. URB. 
INST. & BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-
tax-rates (delineating the top marginal personal income tax rates from 1913–
2020) [perma.cc/2M8Z-KYME]. 
 65. See Wilson Andrews & Alicia Parlapiano, What’s in the Final Republican 
Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/15/us/politics/final-republican-tax-
bill-cuts.html (last updated Dec. 18, 2017) (explaining that the bill cut taxes for 
corporations, lowered individual tax rates until 2025, but would result in a tax 
increase over the long run long after the cuts expire) [perma.cc/RV8C-FPJ9]; see 
also Trump, Republicans’ Tax Reform Law, REALCLEAR POLS., 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/trump_republicans_tax_reform_la
w-6446.html#polls (last visited on Nov. 27, 2020) (showing that news outlets 
reported that a majority of the public opposed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s reform 
to lower the rates on extreme wealth) [perma.cc/9S3B-YBM5]. 
 66. See Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Income Years 1913–
2013, 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal.
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enactment of the income tax in 1913, the highest top marginal 
income tax rate in the United States was typically 50% or higher.67 
In fact, for more than four decades, the top tax rate was 70% or 
higher; with the highest rate being 94% for those earning $200,000 
or more annually in the years 1944 and 1945.68 
B. Capital Gains Advantages 
The tax rate treatment of long-term capital gains, which 
includes investments in Opportunity Zones, exacerbates the 
wealth disparity.69 The lower rates on long-term capital gains have 
existed in varying forms since the 1930s; largely as a result of the 
country’s most wealthy utilizing their wealth—e.g., by making 
donations to candidates—to influence the political system and 
lobby for tax incentives that would place them at an advantage.70 
Those in the highest wealth thresholds would normally be taxed at 
the highest ordinary income tax rate applicable, which is 37%.71 
Instead, because they receive most of their compensation in the 
form of capital gains, they are taxed at a significantly lower rate—
 
pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2020) (reporting that in 1917 those earning $650,000 
annually were subject to a marginal tax rate of 54% while those earning 
$2,000,000 and more were subject to the highest marginal tax rate of 67%); see 
also Grant Suneson, From AMC Networks’s Josh Sapan to Broadcom’s Hock Tan:  
These are the Highest Paid CEOs of 2018, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/12/21/highest-paid-ceos-
2018/38756663/ (last updated Dec. 21, 2018, 7:18 AM) (“Top-performing—and 
sometimes less than top-performing—CEOs are rewarded with lucrative 
contracts that generally include salary, bonuses, stock and options grants, and 
benefits. In a few cases, CEOs are set to earn more than $100 million in total 
compensation in 2018.”) [perma.cc/B72D-AYGK]. 
 67. See generally Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Income Years 
1913–2013, supra note 66.  
 68. Id. 
 69. See Buffet, supra note 62, at 21 (describing how if you make money with 
money, as Buffet’s “super-rich” friends do by investing, you pay practically 
nothing in payroll taxes and only a 15% rate on most of your earnings, but if you 
earn money from a job, your percentage will exceed Buffet’s—”most likely by a 
lot”).  
 70. See id. (“[L]egislators in Washington . . . feel compelled to protect us, 
much as if we were spotted owls or some other endangered species.”).  
 71. See I.R.C. § 1(j)(2) (providing the current rates that are set to expire after 
December 31, 2025).  
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the highest since 2012 being 20%.72 The very wealthy hold most of 
the financial assets in the United States and law makers have 
admitted that in part the legislation was motivated by the desire 
to satisfy those wealthy individuals who are also active political 
donors.73  
Capital gains are profits made from the sale of a capital asset 
and are classified as either short-term or long-term.74 In order to 
determine whether a taxpayer has a capital gain or loss, he or she 
must first know their cost basis in that investment.75 A capital gain 
is generally triggered by the sale or exchange of an investment.76 
Capital gains or losses refer to the increase or decrease in the value 
of an asset between the time of its purchase and the time it is 
 
 72. See Sean Williams, A 95-Year History of Maximum Capital Gains Tax 
Rates in 1 Chart, THE MOTLEY FOOL, 
https://www.fool.com/retirement/2017/02/11/a-95-year-history-of-maximum-
capital-gains-tax-rat.aspx (last updated May, 30, 2018, 4:15 PM) (“With the 
exception of pre-1941 and 2004–2012, maximum capital gains tax rates have 
regularly been 20% or higher. . . . The current rate of 20% is actually low 
compared to where things have been since 1941 . . . .”) [perma.cc/QZD4-XUHJ]. 
 73. See Harry Enten, The GOP Tax Cuts Are Even More Unpopular Than 
Past Tax Hikes, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 29, 2017, 11:15 
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-gop-tax-cuts-are-even-more-
unpopular-than-past-tax-hikes/ (reporting that many Americans were opposed to 
the GOP tax cuts because they believe it disproportionately benefits the rich and 
that the GOP bill is one of the least popular tax plans since Ronald Reagan’s day) 
[perma.cc/2Y5U-MG7Q].  
 74. See I.R.S., supra note 20 (providing examples of capital assets including 
a home, personal-use items like household furnishings, and stocks or bonds held 
as investments); see also Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-
book/how-are-capital-gains-taxed 
(last updated May 2020) (providing background information regarding what 
qualifies as a capital gain and how capital gains are currently taxed under the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017) [perma.cc/KKM5-4XXG]; see also I.R.C. § 1221 
(2018) (defining long-term and short-term capital gains). 
 75. See Kaitlyn Kiernan, Capital Gains Explained, FINRA (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/capital-gains-explained (“For stocks and 
bonds, the basis is generally the price you paid to purchase the securities, 
including purchases made by reinvestment of dividends or capital gains 
distributions, plus other costs such as the commission or other fees you may have 
paid to complete the transaction.”) [perma.cc/4KK3-YWZ2].  
 76. See id. (explaining that your capital gain or loss is the difference between 
the sale price of your investment and the basis); see also I.R.C. § 1222 (defining 
short-term and long-term capital gains). 
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sold.77 This applies to the sale of any capital asset including stocks, 
bonds, and real estate.78 Currently, depending on the taxpayer’s 
income, his or her long-term capital gain tax rate can be anywhere 
from 0% to 20%.79 
Once an asset is sold or transferred to another person or 
entity, a realization event occurs, triggering recognition of the 
gain.80 The wealthy are able to be more flexible in their ability to 
hold on to capital assets indefinitely, thereby shielding themselves 
from taxation as their assets grow in value.81 The timing of when 
these individuals realize the income is largely in their control, 
insofar as they can decide when or whether to sell their assets and 
take advantage of tax deferral.82 Further, this timing control can 
include the decision by the taxpayer to hold the asset until death, 
which results in another preference:  A step-up in basis to heirs 
who inherit the property.83 
Most Americans are not given stock options as a part of their 
compensation packages, and many cannot afford to invest in stocks 
or purchase real estate for the sole purpose of holding the property 
as an investment.84 “While most middle-class Americans own 
 
 77. See Erica York, An Overview of Capital Gains Taxes, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 
16, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/capital-gains-taxes/ (explaining that when a 
capital asset is sold for a profit, the seller faces a tax on the gain that they realized 
and the tax rate applicable to the gain will depend on how long the asset was held 
and the amount of income the taxpayer earns) [perma.cc/87WV-4698]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018) (providing the range of tax rates applicable to capital 
gains). 
 80. See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2018) (mandating that whatever gain is realized 
from dealings in property must be included in gross income unless an exception 
applies). 
 81. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 13, at 13 (explaining how deferring 
taxes allows for the accumulation and preservation of wealth as this allows 
investment returns to compound over time and can lead to higher long-term 
returns). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See I.R.C. § 1014 (providing the basis of property rules when acquired by 
a decedent). 
 84. See Lydia Saad, What Percentage of Americans Owns Stock?, GALLUP, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/266807/percentage-americans-owns-stock.aspx (last 
updated June 4, 2020) (finding that in 2020, 55% of Americans reported owning 
stock, including individual stocks they may own, as well as stocks included in 
mutual funds or retirement savings accounts such as a 401(k) or IRA) 
[perma.cc/6DP5-PAE2]. 
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stocks or bonds, they tend to stash them in tax-sheltered 
retirement accounts, where the capital gains rate does not apply.”85 
Advocates for low capital gains tax rates claim that it spurs more 
investment in the economy, which benefits all Americans.86 Over 
the last twenty years, however, more than 80% of the capital gains 
income realized in the United States has gone to only 5% of the 
population.87 The 400 richest taxpayers in 2008 counted 60% of 
their income in the form of capital gains and 8% from salary and 
wages—the rest of the country reported 5% in capital gains and 
72% in salary and wages.88 
Despite all of this, preferential tax treatment of capital gains 
has its own benefits and is generally looked upon favorably.89 
Lower rates on capital gains encourages investments in capital 
assets, and investments are key for long-term growth.90 Low 
capital gains tax rates also promote selling assets and prevent the 
so-called “lock-in effect,” which results when investors who would 
normally sell assets keep them indefinitely in order to avoid 
taxation.91 Proponents of the preferential rates on capital gains 
 
 85. Steven Mufson & Jia Lynn Yang, Capital Gains Tax Rates Benefiting 




 86. See What is the Effect of a Lower Tax Rate for Capital Gains?, TAX POL’Y 




e,after%2Dtax%20variance%20of%20returns. (last updated May 2020) (“By 
reducing the disincentive to invest, a lower capital gains tax rate might encourage 
more investment, leading to higher economic growth.”) [perma.cc/GUZ8-LXG5]. 
 87. Mufson & Yang, supra note 85 (“Approximately 50 percent of all capital 
gains have gone to the wealthiest 0.1%.”). 
 88. See id. (“The way you get rich in this world is not by working hard,” said 
Marty Sullivan, an economist and a contributing editor to Tax Analysts. “It’s by 
owning large amounts of assets and having those things appreciate in value.”).  
 89. See The Tax Break-Down:  Preferential Rates on Capital Gains, COMM. 
FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.crfb.org/blogs/tax-
break-down-preferential-rates-capital-gains (covering arguments both for and 
against lower rates on capital gains) [perma.cc/QPB5-YS7U].  
 90. Id. (“The value of the capital gains tax preference is significantly higher 
than the potential revenue raised from eliminating it.”).  
 91. See id. (explaining that estimating agencies have predicted that the 
lock-in effect is so severe that taxing capital gains as ordinary income could result 
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also argue that the lower capital gains tax offsets the taxes that 
are already paid at the corporate level, encourages risk taking and 
entrepreneurship, offsets the effects of inflation, and mitigates the 
tax penalty on savings under the income tax.92 That being said, 
some commentators express concern that when capital gains are 
used in the manner that they are with Opportunity Zones, the 
negatives outweigh the positives.93 
C. Direct Versus Indirect Tax Subsidies 
Under the tax expenditure theory, investment tax incentives 
can be understood as “tax subsidies” used to promote 
investments—in practice, special provisions are written into a 
federal tax system in order to achieve non-tax related social and 
economic goals.94 Tax scholar Michelle Layser, who has written 
about Opportunity Zones, notes that the choice between a tax 
incentive as an indirect or direct subsidy “can have important 
implications for the effectiveness of the tax incentives as 
anti-poverty tools.”95 
 
in a loss of revenue relative to the current tax regime). 
 92. See TAX POL’Y CTR. URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., supra note 86 
(comparing the top tax rates on long term capital gains with real economic growth 
from the years 1954 to 2017 and concluding that “the tax rate on capital gains 
does not appear to be a major factor”). 
 93. See Darla Mercado, Advisors Must Weigh Benefits and Real Dangers 
Before Offering this Hot New Tax Play, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/27/advisors-must-assess-risk-and-rewards-of-
opportunity-zone-funds.html (last updated May 28, 2019, 8:44 AM) (advising 
investors to do their due diligence before investing in Opportunity Zones) 
[perma.cc/H32T-6HM8]. 
 94. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy:  A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 706 (1970) (explaining that these provisions could take the 
form of “deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, preferential rates, 
and serve ends similar in nature to those served by direct government 
expenditures or loan programs”). 
 95. See Michelle D. Layser, A Typology of Place-Based Investment Tax 
Incentives, 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 403, 415 (2019) (providing a 
comparison of direct and indirect tax subsidies and how they affect “the types of 
claimants and transactions motivated by the tax incentives”). 
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1. Direct Tax Subsidies 
Direct tax subsidies provide tax breaks directly to businesses 
that operate in low-income communities.96 These tax incentives are 
claimed directly by eligible businesses, which lawmakers 
designate as eligible for the tax incentive.97 The businesses then 
have incentives to perform certain activities in low-income areas.98 
2. Indirect Tax Subsidies 
Indirect tax subsidies are those that target third-party 
investors as claimants, the ultimate goal being to subsidize 
businesses that engage with low-income communities.99 Indirect 
tax subsidies create incentives for investors to make capital 
contributions to businesses in low-income areas.100 They differ 
from direct subsidies in that investors are able to freely choose 
which eligible projects to fund.101 
Opportunity Zone legislation is an indirect tax subsidy 
because it targets investors rather than businesses.102 Taxpayers 
who sell appreciated property can defer or permanently avoid taxes 
they would otherwise owe on the capital gains by reinvesting the 
capital gains in Opportunity Funds.103 
 
 96. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2016)). 
 97. See id. (“Stated simply, direct tax subsidies make it cheaper for eligible 
taxpayers to do business.”). 
 98. See id. at 418 (including activities such as “starting or expanding a 
business, or hiring certain employees”). 
 99. See id. at 417–18 (contrasting direct tax subsidies with indirect tax 
subsidies and the incentives that indirect tax subsidies provide to investors). 
 100. Id. at 418. 
 101. See id. (“By subsidizing the investments, these tax laws decrease the cost 
of capital for businesses that engage with low-income communities, and generally 
increase the availability of financing.”). 
 102. See generally Layser, supra note 95 (providing a comparison of direct and 
indirect tax subsidies and how they affect “the types of claimants and transactions 
motivated by the tax incentives”). 
 103. Compare I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B) (2018) (providing the tax deferrals 
available to taxpayers who invest in Opportunity Zones for five or seven years), 
and I.R.C § 1400Z-2(c) (2018) (providing the tax deferrals available to taxpayers 
who invest in Opportunity Zones for ten years), with I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018) 
(providing the preferential rates for capital gains generally). 
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D. Nomination and Designation of Opportunity Zones 
Opportunity Zones now exist in all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and five U.S. territories.104 Opportunity Zones are 
“economically-distressed communities where new investments, 
under certain conditions, may be eligible for preferential tax 
treatment.”105 Each state’s governor has the opportunity to 
nominate up to 25% of the state’s eligible census tracts—for 
example, if a state has 500 low-income census tracts, 125 may be 
designated as Opportunity Zones.106 The nominated blocks of 
low-income areas by census tract are then certified by the U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury.107  
Many tracts are nominated after being lobbied for by 
development groups or individual investors.108 For example, this 
Note previously mentioned Richard LeFrak, the businessman, real 
estate developer, and personal friend of Donald Trump who had 
executives encourage city officials to nominate North Miami as an 
Opportunity Zone.109 Similarly, the Far West Side of Manhattan is 
part of an Opportunity Zone, despite the fact that more than 15% 
of households there reported a household income of $200,000 or 
more in 2017.110 Because the law does not require disclosure of who 
is taking advantage of the initiative or how they are deploying 
 
 104. See Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions 
(last updated Dec. 15, 2020) (answering frequently asked questions regarding the 
new Opportunity Zone legislation) [perma.cc/Y3UC-S5YU].  
 105. Id. 
 106. See Opportunity Zones:  A New Economic Development Tool for 
Low-Income Communities, Guidance for Governors, ECON. INNOVATION GRP. (Feb. 
2018) (briefing on the role that governors play in the implementation of the 
Opportunity Zone program). 
 107. See id. (explaining that after submission, the Treasury Secretary has 30 
days to certify the state’s Opportunity Zones). 
 108. See Elliot, supra note 36 (“The Trump tax law gave governors the 
authority to distribute valuable tax breaks, and they have wielded it to benefit 
the politically connected.”). 
 109. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33 (reporting that LeFrak had this 
area nominated for a project called Sole Mia—set to include twelve residential 
towers and eight football fields’ worth of retail and commercial space). 
 110. See id. (describing how high-end towers were replacing run-down 
apartment buildings in Manhattan even before the Opportunity Zone legislation 
was enacted). 
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their funds, investors are able to finance luxury hotels with this 
tax-advantaged money—driving money into areas that are already 
on the rise, not those that are struggling.111 
The lack of disclosure requirement leads to instances in which 
city officials are unaware that an opportunity-zone project is even 
being planned.112 Perhaps if city officials were involved in vetting 
the types of investments that are being made, they could achieve 
the goal of benefitting these poor areas. 
1. Life Cycle of an Opportunity Zone 
Investors first file a Form 8996, to notify the IRS of the 
creation of a Qualified Opportunity Fund (QOF)—generally, in the 
form of a vehicle structured as either a partnership or corporation 
and organized for the purpose of investing in an Opportunity 
Zone.113 In order to invest in the QOF, a taxpayer must sell a 
capital asset, generate a capital gain, and reinvest that unrealized 
capital gain into a QOF within 180 days of the sale.114 
A taxpayer then reinvests short or long term capital gains 
from a prior investment, within 180 days, into a QOF and defers 
taxes on the gain for the year of sale à the QOF conducts a 
 
 111. See id. (reporting that the Warehouse District of New Orleans, a very 
trendy area, has been designated as an Opportunity Zone and will benefit Richard 
Branson’s Virgin Hotels chain, unveiled one year before the legislation was 
announced—investors will now earn greater profits than they otherwise would 
have). 
 112. See id. (stating that the head of economic development for New Orleans 
was unaware of the Branson Hotel being planned less than two miles away from 
one of the poorest Opportunity Zones in Louisiana and the nation, the Hoffman 
Triangle neighborhood, where the average household earns less than $15,000 
annually). 
 113. See Morgan Simon, What You Need to Know About Opportunity Zones, 
FORBES (Mar. 30, 2019, 4:03 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/03/30/what-you-need-to-know-
about-opportunity-zones/#63a4abb56ae2 (providing guidelines and outlining the 
mechanisms and logistics to investing in an Opportunity Zone) [perma.cc/MP9G-
GYNS]; see also Instructions for Form 8996, Qualified Opportunity Fund, I.R.S. 
(Jan. 2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8996.pdf. 
 114. See Jacoby, supra note 30 (“Because taxpayers must have unrealized 
capital gains to invest in an Opportunity Zone, and capital gains are heavily 
concentrated among the wealthy, the tax break will directly benefit wealthy 
investors.”); see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A) (mandating the reinvestment take 
place within 180 days of the sale of the capital asset). 
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“Section 162 business,”115 either directly by holding qualified 
Opportunity Zone business property (QOZBP) or indirectly by 
holding Opportunity Zone stock or an Opportunity Zone 
partnership interest, provided the subsidiary meets the definition 
of a qualified Opportunity Zone business (QOZB) à After holding 
the interest in the QOF for five years, the taxpayer will exclude 
10% of the original deferred gain à After an additional two years, 
another 5% of the original deferred gain is excluded à Any 
remaining deferred gain will be recognized on December 31, 2026, 
unless an “inclusion event” occurs prior to that date à After 
holding the interest in the QOF for a total of ten years, the 
taxpayer may sell the investment in the QOF, or—in limited 
circumstances—the QOF or QOZB may sell its assets—at any time 
before 2048 and the taxpayer can exclude all—or most of—the gain 
resulting from the sale.116 
For example, someone who buys stock for $100,000 and sells 
it more than one year later for $1.1 million would ordinarily have 
$1 million subject to the capital gains tax.117 However, if the 
investor instead invested the $100,000 in an Opportunity Zone for 
five years, the original basis in the stock of $100,000, would be 
stepped up to $200,000.118 It would be stepped up again to $250,000 
if the investment was held on to for seven years.119 The result of 
this tax benefit is that it reduces the amount of gain ultimately 
subject to taxation. Taxes on capital gains from investments in the 
qualified Opportunity Zones can be avoided all together, if held for 
 
 115. See I.R.C. § 162 (2018) (providing deductions for business expenses); see 
also Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987) (holding that in order 
“to be engaged in a trade or business the taxpayer must be involved in an activity 
with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose for 
engaging in the activity must be for income or profit . . . . A sporadic activity, a 
hobby, or an amusement does not qualify”).  
 116. See Tony Nitti, IRS Publishes Final Opportunity Zone Regulations:  
Putting it All Together, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2019, 9:11 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2019/12/23/irs-publishes-final-
opportunity-zone-regulations-putting-it-all-together/#56dd9fe72551 (providing 
this life cycle and noting that a QOF must conduct business in an Opportunity 
Zone, either directly or indirectly, to be tested every six months at which time at 
least 90% of the QOF’s assets must be QOZP or an interest in a subsidiary entity 
conducting a QOZB) [perma.cc/8NQL-TBVE].  
 117. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018).  
 118. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2018).  
 119. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2018).  
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at least ten years.120 This is an incredibly preferential benefit—the 
Economic Innovation Group calculated that this would result in a 
net after-tax profit of $7,600 on the initial $100,000 investment, 
compared to $3,600 if the original capital gain had been invested 
in a regular stock portfolio, assuming 7% annual return rates for 
both.121 
E. Characteristics and Demographics of Opportunity Zones 
“Opportunity Zone legislation is intended to seed new 
startups, accelerate business expansions, create jobs, increase and 
improve housing options, and revitalize the built environment in 
distressed communities across the country.”122 The intended 
recipients of all of these benefits are not only the investors, but the 
residents of these zones.123 So, who are the residents of 
Opportunity Zones throughout the country? The majority of 
Opportunity Zone residents, 56%, are non-white minorities, 
compared to 39% of non-white minorities who make up the country 
as a whole.124 Black Americans are particularly over-represented 
 
 120. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (2018).  
 121. See Lydia Depillis, A ‘Mind Boggling’ Tax Break was Meant to Help the 
Poor. But Trendy Areas are Winning Too, CNN BUS., 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/14/economy/opportunity-zones-investing-los-
angeles/index.html (last updated June 14, 2019, 8:32 AM) (“Looked at another 
way, if a stock market portfolio generated after-tax returns of about 2.8% per 
year, the Opportunity Zone incentive amounts to an extra 3 percentage points on 
top of that if held for 10 years, which can add up to a lot for larger deals.”) 
[perma.cc/ESJ8-8C74]. 
 122. See Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GRP. (Jan. 2020), 
https://eig.org/opportunityzones/facts-and-figures (“How do Opportunity Zones 
work? Investors can now choose to roll capital gains over into qualified 
Opportunity Funds, which in turn channel patient capital into qualifying equity 
investments in Opportunity Zones for at least a decade in exchange for capital 
gains tax reductions and possible exemptions.”) [perma.cc/8WNU-KDYJ]. 
 123. See id. (“This new source of risk capital will seed new startups, accelerate 
business expansions, create jobs, increase and improve housing options, and 
revitalize the built environment in distressed communities across the country.”) 
[perma.cc/8WNU-KDYJ]. 
 124. See Kenan Fikri & John Lettieri, The State of Socioeconomic Need and 
Community Change in Opportunity Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., 5, 7 (Dec. 
2018) (outlining characteristics of the average Opportunity Zone—the Median 
Family Income of the median zone being $42,400, 40% below the national median 
of $67,900 or only three-fifths of the national level).  
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in Opportunity Zones, constituting twice as large a share of the 
zone population as they do the national population.125 Hispanic 
Americans make up 18% of the general population and 26% of the 
Opportunity Zone population.126 
In total, 7.9 million Americans residing in Opportunity Zones 
live in poverty—the average poverty rate in the zones being 27.7%, 
compared to a national poverty rate of 14.1%.127 Three-fifths of 
zones have a Median Family Income (MFI) below $50,000 with 
only 6% of zones having a MFI greater than the national MFI.128 
There are more Opportunity Zones in the $40,000 to $42,500 range 
than there are above the national MFI of $73,965.129 Within 
Opportunity Zones, 21.1% of adults do not have a high school 
diploma, and 18.1% of adults have a bachelor’s degree or higher.130 
While these statistics sound encouraging, as if Opportunity 
Zones are in fact targeting the most in need areas, the definition of 
“low-income community” is broad enough to include some areas 
that are not truly distressed.131 Further problematic is the fact that 
the incentive does not include any requirements that the 
investments actually produce public benefits or that the 
Opportunity Zone investment businesses hire employees from 
residents of, or provide services to, the local community.132 
III. Gaming the Opportunity Zone System 
As highlighted in Part II of this Note, some of the tracts that 
have been designated Opportunity Zones are not low-income areas 
 
 125. See ECON. INNOVATION GRP., supra note 122 (reporting that Black 
Americans represent 12% of the United States and 23% of the demographics in 
Opportunity Zones). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. See Jacoby, supra note 30 (explaining that some areas are “adjacent to 
elite colleges—for example, the University of Virginia and University of 
California at Berkeley, where a large concentration of students skews the income 
data”). 
 132. See id. (highlighting that the program mechanics fail to specify rules that 
will provide benefits to local residents of zones). 
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at all.133 Over 200 of the 8,800 designated Opportunity Zones are 
adjacent to poor areas but are not themselves considered 
low-income.134 Moreover, the investments that many investors are 
making in the areas that are designated do not necessarily help 
low-income communities at all.135 Current law does not require 
public disclosure of who is taking advantage of the initiative or how 
they are deploying their funds.136 Many high profile investors had 
committed to funding projects before the legislation was 
announced, and will now receive substantial tax benefits for 
pouring money into areas they had already planned to invest in 
and profit from.137 The investments they are making in luxury real 
estate and retailers will probably displace residents, as it is 
unlikely that they will be able to afford to live in such places if costs 
rise.138 Critics are concerned that the bulk of Opportunity Zone 
money is going toward places that do not need the help, rather than 
poorer communities that could stand to benefit more.139 “Local 
residents will benefit only to the extent that the tax break 
encourages new investments (not those that would have occurred 
 
 133. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33 (discussing some of the most 
prominent and wealthy investors in Opportunity Zones and the ways in which 
they are using the investments as vehicles to benefit themselves).  
 134. See id. (“The idea was to enable governors to draw Opportunity Zones in 
ways that would include projects or businesses just outside poor census tracts, 
potentially creating jobs for low-income people.”).  
 135. Id.  
 136. See Elliot, supra note 36 (“It’s unclear how valuable the tax break could 
be, and the public may never know because the Trump law included no public 
reporting requirements.”).  
 137. See id. (stating that Huizenga wrote that the luxury apartment towers 
were planned some time ago and once the legislation was announced, the tract 
they fall in was lobbied to be designated as an Opportunity Zone).  
 138. See Jim Tankersley, Amazon’s New York Home Qualifies as ‘Distressed’ 
under Federal Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/amazon-hq2-long-island-
city.html (describing how Amazon’s choice to open headquarters in an upscale 
area of Long Island City gives eager developers who, would have flocked to the 
area anyway, tax benefits of Opportunity Zones and whether this is a good use of 
public subsidies is a question that remains to be answered) [perma.cc/H56A-
EUEG].  
 139. See generally Jacoby, supra note 30 (“[T]he tax break risks exacerbating 
the three main flaws of the 2017 tax law itself: it mainly benefits wealthy 
investors instead of workers and residents of distressed communities, reduces 
federal revenues and makes our long term fiscal challenges worse, and creates 
new opportunities for tax avoidance.”). 
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anyway); creates jobs for residents, spurs the development of new, 
affordable housing; or creates broader economic improvements 
that reach local residents.”140 
In order to assess how the new legislation may ultimately 
affect the zones and their residents, scholars have looked to 
similarly enacted past programs and those outcomes. 
A. New Markets Tax Credit Incentive 
Similar to the Opportunity Zone program, the New Markets 
Tax Credit (NMTC) was established in 2000 and is an indirect tax 
incentive claimed by third parties who invest in entities that, in 
turn, invest in targeted places.141 NMTCs provide federal tax 
credits for investors who make Qualified Equity Investments 
(QEIs) in Community Development Entities (CDEs).142 CDEs then 
use the proceeds of the QEIs to make Qualified Low-Income 
Community Investments (QLICs).143 The program provides a total 
tax credit144 of 39% of the original amount invested in the CDE, 
applied over a seven-year period.145 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. See Introduction to the New Markets Tax Credit Program, CMTY. DEV. 
FIN. INST. FUND, 7 (Sept. 15, 2020), 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/2020%20Introduction%20to%20the%20NM
TC%20Program_%20FINAL.pdf (explaining that the NMTC program is jointly 
administered by the CDFI Fund and I.R.S. “to expand economic opportunity for 
underserved people and communities by supporting the growth and capacity of a 
national network of community development lenders, investors, and financial 
service providers”) [perma.cc/V28T-BDJX].  
 142. See id. at 16 (defining certified CDEs as a domestic corporation or 
partnership that is an intermediary vehicle for the provision of loans, 
investments, or financial counseling in low-income communities and is certified 
as such by the CDFI Fund). 
 143. See id. at 8 (providing an example of a QLIC as business loans made in 
low-income communities).  
 144. See Troy Segal, Tax Credit, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxcredit.asp (last updated May 25, 2020) 
(defining a tax credit as “an amount of money that taxpayers can subtract from 
taxes owed to their government,” reducing the actual amount of tax owed and 
explaining that governments may grant a tax credit in order to promote a specific 
behavior) [perma.cc/TCF8-3EB5]. 
 145. See CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, supra note 141, at 9 (illustrating that 
the credit rate is 5% of the original investment amount in each of the first three 
years and 6% of the original investment amount in each of the final four years, 
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The NMTCs and Opportunity Zone legislation define 
low-income communities in the same way.146 A significant 
difference between the Opportunity Zone and NMTC program is 
that Opportunity Zone investors choose the investments that they 
will make in Opportunity Zones themselves, while the Community 
Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund) evaluates 
NMTC investments based on a competitive application process.147 
Opportunity Zones are tied to the previous ownership of capital 
gains and reinvesting prior gains, which makes it more difficult for 
non-profit programs to participate in the program.148 NMTCs are 
not tied to ownership of capital gains, and loans to nonprofit 
organizations qualify for the initiative.149 These differences in the 
programs appear to have led to very different types of projects 
being subsidized by the programs.150 Researchers estimate that 
26% of Opportunity Zone funding is likely to subsidize luxury, 
market rate apartments and condos, while 21% of NMTC 
investments will go toward education and only 12% will go toward 
apartments and condos.151  
 
amounting to 39% of the original amount invested in the CDE after seven years). 
 146. See I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income community under the 
NMTC); see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1) (2018) (“[T]he ‘low income community’ has 
the same meaning as when used in section 45D(e).”). 
 147. See Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce 
Geographic Inequality, TAX L. REV. at 37 (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516469# (CDEs that apply 
for NMTC allocations are “evaluated on factors such as whether a proposed 
grocery store would be located in a food desert, or whether a proposed medical 
facility would be located in a medically underserved area”) [perma.cc/MNM6-
TNRS]. 
 148. See Jack Abdo, Nonprofits:  Leverage a Qualified Opportunity Zone Fund 
to Further Your Mission, ABDO EICK & MEYERS LLP, 
https://aemcpas.com/nonprofits-leverage-a-qualified-opportunity-zone-fund-to-
further-your-mission/ (suggesting non-profits partner with donors to acquire 
property in QOZs, donors could lease buildings nonprofits to get into the building 
at an affordable rate, then collect rent and plan to either sell or donate the 
building back to the nonprofit) [perma.cc/EH8M-3QHK]. 
 149. See PowerPoint, Michelle Layser, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Ill. at 
Urbana Champaign, Comparing Opportunity Zones to New Markets Tax Credit, 
ABA Tax Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 2020) (on file with author). 
 150. Id.  
 151. See id. (reporting that 11% of Opportunity Zone funds will go toward 
office space potentially for tech startups that require high level of skill; 6% will 
go toward retail and restaurants and it remains to be seen what 39% of the 
investments will go toward).  
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According to the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 
NMTCs have “failed to deliver any measurable increase in the well 
beings of targeted communities.”152 It may be too early to assess 
Opportunity Zones’ impact, but analysts suggest that “the 
Opportunity Zones statute and available agency guidance provide 
no reasons to expect the Opportunity Zones laws to benefit poor 
communities any more effectively than the NMTC. Instead, they 
include several reasons to expect the new laws to target poor 
communities even less closely than the NMTC.”153 
A lack of guidance as to the types of investments that should 
be made in Opportunity Zones, no requirements pertaining to job 
creation or “community-oriented activity,” and the 
self-certification process for Opportunity Funds with little 
oversight are a few reasons why the “law’s potential as an 
anti-poverty program is limited.”154 
B. Empowerment Zones 
The federal Empowerment Zone program is one of the largest 
place-based tax incentive programs in the United States—
implemented to encourage economic, physical, and social 
investment in the neediest urban areas of the country.155 
Empowerment zone designation provides two important benefits:  
 
 152. See Alexander Ferrer & Joe Donlin, Displacement Zones:  How 
Opportunity Zones Turn Communities into Tax Shelters for the Rich 9, STRATEGIC 
ACTIONS FOR A JUST ECON., https://www.saje.net/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/SAJE_DisplacementZones.pdf (noting that “while the 
program was popular with investors and successful in steering investment the 
program uniformly failed to improve the incomes of residents of zip codes 
receiving the funding”) [perma.cc/VM64-46AQ]. 
 153. See Layser, supra note 95, at 450 (explaining that one reason to expect 
the program to target poor communities poorly is that Opportunity Zone projects 
will probably be more clustered than NMTC projects which has been shown to 
have positive correlation with rent increase). 
 154. Id. at 451–52. 
 155. See Matias Busso, Jesse Gregory & Patrick Kline, Results of the Federal 
Urban Empowerment Zone Program 18, 
https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jmgregory/FOCUS_EZ_summary.pdf (stating that the 
first round of the program began in 1993, with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) assigning Empowerment Zone status to poor 
neighborhoods in six metropolitan areas:  Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, 
New York City, and Philadelphia-Camden) [perma.cc/75FC-DUNQ]. 
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(1) It entitles local employers to a credit of up to 20% of the first 
$15,000 in wages paid to each employee who lived and worked in 
the community for up to ten years, with the maximum annual 
credit per employee declining over time and (2) each zone is eligible 
for $100 million in Social Service Block Grant funds.156 “The 
Empowerment Zone subsidies stimulate the demand for labor and 
land in targeted areas.”157 For example, a firm that could profitably 
employ a local worker for $15,000 in the absence of the subsidy, 
can employ the same worker for $18,000 when offered a $3,000 
employment tax credit.158 Similarly, the block grants also give rise 
to increased wages.159 However, “one 2010 study of the impact of 
the program in California found that it unequivocally failed to 
achieve its stated goal of increasing employment despite offering 
substantial benefits to businesses operating inside the zones.”160 
Opportunity Zones differ from both the NMTC and 
Empowerment Zone programs in that the incentives the legislation 
provides are far more valuable to investors and less restricted than 
these predecessors.161 It applies to almost any type of project, 
requires no bureaucratic approval or monitoring, and has no cap.162 
 
 156. See id. at 18 (explaining that the Social Service Block Grant funds could 
be used in a variety of ways such as business assistance, infrastructure 
investment, physical development, training programs, youth services, promotion 
of homeownership, and emergency housing assistance).  
 157. Id. 
 158. See id. (illustrating through example how this leads to increases in wages 
for employees and is effectively an income transfer to local workers).  
 159. See id. (“[M]aking local firms more productive through infrastructure 
investments and initiatives promoting safety and other local public goods. These 
productivity improvements should transfer into the wages of all zone workers 
whether they live in the zone or not.”).  
 160. See Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 9 (“Other researchers noted that 
in the longest existing Empowerment Zone in the country the program not only 
failed to produce jobs in the originally designated area, but in fact jobs were lost, 
and that benefits flowed overwhelmingly to large corporations rather than small 
businesses.”).  
 161. See Joseph Bateman, How Do Opportunity Zones Differ from Existing 
Federal Tax Incentives for Community Development?, SUMMIT LLC (Feb. 26, 2018, 
8:51 AM), https://www.summitllc.us/blog/how-do-opportunity-zones-differ-from-
existing-federal-tax-incentives-for-community-development (contrasting the 
fixed and limited amount of investment allowed by NMTCs each year with 
Opportunity Zones which require no such oversight which could “create the 
potential for the benefits of these investments to accrue primarily to 
investors . . . .”) [perma.cc/KF7D-UE9G]. 
 162. See Depillis, supra note 121 (comparing the Opportunity Zone program 
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IV. The Effect Opportunity Zones Have on Residents 
Opportunity Zones are intended to be some of the poorest 
census tracts in the nation; however, residents of those poor 
neighborhoods are unlikely to benefit from or be able to afford 
rising real estate, which will most likely manifest in those 
communities as higher rent prices.163 Homeownership levels are 
very low in Opportunity Zones, as most residents cannot afford to 
purchase homes and many of the homeowners who live in zones 
are cost burdened.164 This threat to local residents’ housing is 
potentially exacerbated by the requirements for property that can 
qualify as Opportunity Zone property.165 The original use 
requirement of the legislation mandates that the asset in an 
Opportunity Zone has never been placed in service before.166 
Alternatively, the substantial improvement rule mandates that 
pre-existing assets within the zones be renovated or rebuilt so that 
the basis of the property is more than doubled by the 
improvements made to it after purchase by a QOF.167 These 
requirements can lead to displacement, particularly in the 
substantial improvement scenario.168 Whether the building is 
 
to the NMTC and Empowerment Zone program and highlighting that the 
Opportunity Zone investors are far less restricted in the types of investments they 
can make). 
 163. See Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 14 (“Competition with and 
between corporate investors limits homeownership opportunities for lower 
income families, and drives up rents and assesses irrational and burdensome fees 
as investors squeeze tenants for extra profit.”).  
 164. See id. (rising prices of homes and land may push these residents out, 
rather than providing them with the financial benefits that come with rising home 
values—it may raise incentive for them to sell their homes and move to cheaper 
areas).  
 165. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (d)(2)(D)(ii) (2018) (requiring that all property must 
be originally used or substantially improved in order to qualify). 
 166. See id. (same).  
 167. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1, 866 (Jan. 
13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (clarifying that the land upon which a 
building is located is not required to be separately substantially improved, the 
requirement is only in regard to the original basis in the building).  
 168. See Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 14 (reporting that one 
community leader in South-Central Los Angeles described the Opportunity Zone 
requirements as what “seems like a slick way to undermine rent control”). 
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rebuilt or renovated to double its value, the result is that many 
tenants will not be able to afford to return to the building.169 
A. Gentrification 
“Cities in the United States up and down the urban hierarchy 
have experienced significant levels of gentrification since the 
national economy emerged from the recession of the 1990s.”170 The 
introduction of the Opportunity Zone program threatens to 
accelerate this process within the designated tracts.171 
1. The Case Study of Los Angeles 
As of June 2019, the capital flowing into the Opportunity Zone 
program was just beginning and data were scarce, yet “anecdotal 
reporting suggests that Los Angeles is a microcosm of how the 
program is playing out nationally.”172 Luxury housing projects are 
already displacing long-term residents, most of whom are African 
Americans, in neighborhoods of Los Angeles like Crenshaw.173 
 
 169. See id. (providing an example of a building with a value of $500,000 that 
must then be improved upon so that it is valued at $1,000,0001, in order to meet 
the § 1400Z-2 (d)(2)(D)(ii) requirements).  
 170. See Edward Goetz, Gentrification in Black and White:  The Racial Impact 
of Public Housing Demolition in American Cities, URB. STUD. 1581 (June 2011), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0042098010375323 (“Prominent 
among public-sector interventions has been the demolition of public housing and 
in some cases multimillion-dollar redevelopment efforts.”) [perma.cc/83LC-
K87X]. 
 171. See Angela Peoples, Opinion:  Opportunity Zones are Just an Opportunity 
for the Rich to Gentrify Poor Neighborhoods, MKT. WATCH (Oct. 29, 2019, 6:09 
AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/opportunity-zones-are-just-an-
opportunity-for-the-rich-to-gentrify-poor-neighborhoods-2019-10-29 (arguing 
that while the idea is for the new investment to create jobs, there are no 
requirements on what the investments look like and investors can “come in, build 
new housing developments or businesses that local residents can’t afford, get 
their tax break, and leave”) [perma.cc/BL24-NM4L]. 
 172. See Depillis, supra note 121 (stating that investments are being funneled 
into areas like Los Angeles, Koreatown along with parts of Hollywood, Downtown, 
and the Arts District instead of places like Compton, where the median household 
income is $35,457, just above half of the national median).  
 173. See id. (describing how people who are interested in projects that are 
community-centered such as affordable housing, health care clinics, grocery 
stores, and businesses that employ local residents are scrambling for investor 
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The trends of neighborhood change and increased real estate 
prices are likely to continue accelerating generally, especially in 
cities like Los Angeles where there is already a heavy focus on real 
estate investment evident in existing QOFs.174 For example, CIM 
group, one of the largest real estate developers in the country, 
created a $5 billion fund and “owns hundreds of Los Angeles 
properties including many commercial properties in the West 
Adams Corridor, which they plan to redevelop extensively.”175 
HighBridge Properties created an opportunity fund it claims has a 
$50 million value to invest in off-campus student housing for 
California universities, which “could exacerbate already existing 
trends of gentrification and displacement near schools like the 
University of Southern California.”176 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, thousands of families have 
been forced to rent their homes from large institutions financed by 
Wall Street investment funds that bought homes being foreclosed 
on.177 Wall Street investment funds’ monopolizing rental markets 
 
attention as investors are drawn to the larger returns on their investments 
provided by luxury projects). 
 174. See Joseph Pimentel, Businesses are Missing a Lucrative Part of 
Opportunity Zones, Experts Say, BISNOW (Sept. 2, 2019), 
https://www.bisnow.com/feature/los-angeles-opportunity-zones/qualified-
opportunity-zone-business-100559 (explaining that most investors are focused on 
the real estate investment side of the program and flipping commercial real estate 
in order to receive an investment return two to four times what they invested) 
[perma.cc/QG4V-C7N8]. 
 175. See Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 13 (focusing on funding 
multi-family housing developments and the substantial improvement rule 
together threaten rent stabilized housing as well as affordable housing options 
for local residents). 
 176. See id. at 19 (describing how the University of Southern California 
stands to benefit greatly by owning huge amounts of real estate in designated 
tracts and planning to expand—U.S.C. has a “history of expansion that is dotted 
with displacement” and $5.5 billion endowment that will likely be used for real 
estate development).  
 177. See Alana Semuels, When Wallstreet is Your Landlord, THE ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-
family-landlords-wall-street/582394/ (“Between 2011 and 2017, some of the 
world’s largest private-equity groups and hedge funds, as well as other large 
investors, spent a combined $36 billion on more than 200,000 homes in ailing 
markets across the country.”) [perma.cc/TM7L-7JVJ]; see also Wall Street 
Landlords turn American Dream into a Nightmare 10, AMERICANS FOR FIN. 
REFORM, PUB. ADVOCS. MAKING RTS. REAL & ALL. OF CALIFORNIANS FOR CMTY. 
EMPOWERMENT INST., 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/acceinstitute/pages/100/attachments/ori
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allows corporate landlords to have unfair price-setting power.178 
Starwood Homes, a Real Estate Investment Trust, profited 
substantially from the 2008 financial crisis by buying homes at 
significantly reduced prices, and has created a $500 million QOF 
to further its suspect practices.179 By providing powerful tax 
deferral benefits to investors, Opportunity Zones facilitate “wealth 
building for the wealthy,” at the expense of the low-income 
residents in those communities.180 “The demolition of historic 
housing stock also threatens to intensify the indirect displacement 
pressures on community members by further raising land values 
in surrounding areas, and by creating developments like luxury 
housing and upscale shopping that do not serve existing 
community members and will draw new higher income residents, 
which can further the cycle of gentrification and displacement.”181 
V. Regulations 
While the Opportunity Zone program’s purpose is to bring tax 
benefits to investors and economic development to low-income 
communities, the program lacks directive rules and restrictions 
that could aid in pushing capital into depressed communities.182 
 
ginal/1516388955/WallstreetLandlordsFinalReport.pdf?1516388955 (“The 
concentration of rental housing held by financial companies as capital assets 
changes the purpose and quality of the housing.”) [perma.cc/XL7T-JESH]. 
 178. See Semuels, supra note 177 (reporting that corporate landlords focus on 
short-term profits in order to please shareholders at the expense of tenants); see 
generally Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 14. 
 179. See generally Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 14; see also James 
Sprow, Starwood to Raise $500 Million for Opportunity Zone Investments, BLUE 
VAULT (Jan. 31, 2019), https://bluevaultpartners.com/news/starwood-to-raise-
500-million-for-opportunity-zone-investments/ (“Starwood, which has a portfolio 
of 58 properties in Opportunity Zones, intends to invest in markets where it has 
‘a strong real estate presence,’ including the West Coast, Southeast and 
metropolitan areas like New York and Washington, D.C.”) [perma.cc/38Z2-
BGV2]. 
 180. See Ferrer & Donlin, supra note 152, at 14 (highlighting the 
consequences of treating housing as solely an investment strategy). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally Bateman, supra note 161 (describing how, unlike 
previously enacted federal programs meant to attract private investment in 
low-income communities, no annual Congressional approval or allocation of 
limited tax credits is required). 
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“Designating an area is insufficient to ensure engagement with 
local residents. Without some requirement that the businesses 
engage with the local community in some way, eligibility based on 
location likely belies a spatially-oriented tax incentive.”183 
A. Restrictions on “Sin Businesses” 
During the proposed regulation’s notice and comment period, 
the Department of Treasury and Internal Revenue Service 
received several comments regarding “sin businesses.”184 An aspect 
of the legislation was to prevent a QOZB from operating a sin 
business; even so, this is circumventable as QOZBs are not 
prohibited from leasing their property to a sin business.185 The 
final regulations prohibit a QOZB from leasing more than 5% of its 
property to a sin business—a de minimis threshold to reduce risk 
of QOZB businesses’ inadvertently violating the sin business 
prohibition.186 
 
 183. See Lorraine Mirabella, Hogan Proposes $56.5 Million to Spur 
Development and Business Creation in Maryland ‘Opportunity Zones’, BALT. SUN 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-hogan-opportunity-
zone-state-invesmtment-20190103-story.html (detailing Maryland Governor 
Larry Hogan’s proposition to Maryland’s Opportunity Zones the most competitive 
in the nation by having “state agencies work collaboratively with our county and 
municipal governments and the private sector to supercharge our opportunity 
zone revitalization”) [perma.cc/Q7MT-L7QS]. 
 184. See I.R.C. § 144(c)(6)(B) (restricting the financing of certain facilities 
known as “sin businesses” which includes private or commercial golf courses, 
country clubs, massage parlors, hot tub facilities, suntan facilities, racetracks or 
other facilities used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is 
the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises); see also Investing in 
Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,923 (Jan. 13, 2020) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (providing that the final regulations do not extend the 
prohibition on sin businesses to the definition of a QOF because section 1400Z-2 
explicitly prohibits QOZBs from operating sin businesses, but sets forth no such 
prohibition for QOFs). 
 185. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,929 
(Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“These commenters emphasized 
that section 1400Z–2(d)(3)(A)(iii) clearly conveyed Congress’ intent that a 
qualified opportunity zone business should not be a sin business, and therefore 
should not be permitted to circumvent the substance of the sin business 
prohibition simply through leasing its property to such business.”).  
 186. See id. at 1930 (resulting in a QOZB not being invalidated by a small 
amount of sin business).  
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The sin business prohibition applies to funds being invested in 
QOZBs, but does not disallow QOFs from operating sin businesses 
directly.187 This inconsistent language creates disparate treatment 
of sin businesses depending on what kind of entity owns and 
operates them.188 In order to prevent this inconsistent treatment 
of sin business operation, this Note recommends that QOFs also be 
prohibited from operating sin businesses directly. The purpose of 
development in these communities should be to promote greater 
housing affordability and security for families who are most at risk 
of displacement.189 Investments should drive growth and 
prosperity for current low-income residents and disadvantaged 
communities within the zones, and increase services available to 
vulnerable populations such as affordable transportation options, 
health-care facilities, healthy food retail, and quality education 
services.190 Allowing sin businesses to operate via QOFs puts 
communities at risk of investments that may cause more harm 
than good to low-income residents and defeats the purpose of 
prohibiting QOZBs from operating sin businesses. 
B. The Substantial Improvement Rule 
Because the QOF must bring new property to the entity to be 
used in the Opportunity Zone, a fund that simply acquires property 
already being used in the zone will not qualify unless it is 
substantially improved upon.191 This is to ensure that new 
 
 187. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,923 
(Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (creating disparate treatment of 
sin businesses depending on whether they are being operated by a QOZB or 
directly in a QOF).  
 188. See Nitti, supra note 116 (advising taxpayers to conduct businesses 
within a zone in a QOZB unless they plan on running a sin business which should 
operate directly in a QOF).  
 189. See Recommendations for Opportunity Zones, POLICYLINK, 
https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/PolicyLink%20Recommendations%
20for%20Opportunity%20Zones%20.pdf (advocating for a proactive approach 
that would guide Opportunity Zones toward such an outcome) [perma.cc/W67P-
5L3X]. 
 190. See id. (suggesting types of development that these disinvested 
communities would benefit from and need in order to be lifted and as a result aid 
in reducing the racial wealth gap).  
 191. See generally Aaron Waites, Jason Walker & Jennifer Proper, Qualified 
Opportunity Zones:  What Investors Should Know, WELLS FARGO (May. 2020), 
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investments and improvements are being made in Opportunity 
Zones so that taxpayers are not simply acquiring and holding on to 
existing property indefinitely, unless it is substantially improved 
by rebuilding or renovation.192 The substantial improvement 
requirement mandates improvements equal to the QOF’s initial 
investment in the existing property over a 30-month period.193 
The May 2019 regulations initially proposed that substantial 
improvement computations be calculated on an asset-by-asset 
basis.194 Many commenters requested that the final regulations 
adopt an aggregate approach to determine substantial 
improvement, allowing two or more buildings or structures to be 
treated as a single unit of property, provided that other 
qualifications are met.195 Other commenters recommended 
retaining the asset-by-asset approach because the alternate 
approach encourages businesses to “target investments narrowly 
in rigidly defined areas, preventing broader disbursement of 
capital investment.”196 
The final regulations have adopted the aggregation approach 
to determine substantial improvement, and this change has made 
it easier for buildings and structures to qualify as substantially 
 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/the-private-bank/insights/planning/wpu-qualified-
opportunity-zones/ (providing an explanation and key takeaways for investors 
and explaining the workings of Opportunity Zones at the funding level) 
[perma.cc/A3ER-SZD5]. 
 192. See Nitti, supra note 116 (noting that the spirit of the law does not allow 
investors to simply buy raw land and hold it for ten years in order to exclude their 
capital gains because this benefits no one other than the investor).  
 193. See Waites, Walker & Proper, supra note 191, at 5 (“For instance, if an 
Opportunity Zone Fund acquires existing real property in an Opportunity Zone 
for $1 million, the fund has 30 months to invest an additional $1 million for 
improvements to that property in order to qualify for this program.”).  
 194. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,655 (May 
1, 2019) (requesting comments on advantages and disadvantages of adopting an 
aggregate approach, instead of asset-by-asset, for the application of the 
substantial improvement rule).  
 195. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,912 
(Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (requiring that the assets are 
used in the same trade or business in the Opportunity Zone and improve the 
functionality of the non-original use assets in the same Opportunity Zone).  
 196. See id. (“Such commenters also emphasized that, by requiring the basis 
of each discrete asset to be doubled in value, the proposed regulations will ensure 
a minimum level of investment for each qualified asset.”). 
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improved.197 For example, imagine two adjacent buildings that 
have starting bases of $400 and $500 and pass other tests required 
to aggregate.198 If a QOZB undertakes improvements and 
renovations worth $305 for the first building, and $600 for the 
second, under the proposed regulations the rehabilitation of the 
first building would have failed because the $305 of rehabilitation 
is less than its $400 original basis.199 However, under the final 
regulations, the total rehabilitation, $905, is more than the 
aggregate basis of the two buildings, $900, and the rehabilitation 
passes the Opportunity Zone improvement requirement.200 
This Note proposes that the asset-by-asset approach be 
adopted because the aggregate basis approach ultimately reduces 
the amount of investment that is required to be made in assets 
within zones. By adopting the asset-by-asset approach, each 
existing property receives greater investment and addresses 
commenters’ concerns that aggregation would prevent great 
disbursement of investment. This recommendation, coupled with 
an employment requirement, would (1) funnel more investment 
funds into the communities and (2) simultaneously cure the 
displacement that can result from the substantial improvement 
requirement, as residents who are employed in the zones are more 
likely to be able to afford to continue living in those zones. 
C. States Taking Action 
 
 197. See Nitti, supra note 116 (“The regulations allow, in limited 
circumstances, a QOF or QOZB that owns several buildings within a QOZ to 
aggregate the basis and improvements made to the buildings for the purposes of 
measuring substantial improvement.”).  
 198. See Forrest David Milder, Insight:  Highlights of the Final Opportunity 
Zone Regulations, BLOOMBERG TAX (Jan. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/insight-highlights-of-the-final-
opportunity-zone-regulations (providing this example and walking through the 
major changes enacted by the December 2019 final regulations) [perma.cc/5TBT-
MXV3]. 
 199. See id. (explaining that under the proposed regulation asset-by-asset 
method, at least $400, or the amount of the basis in the property, must have been 
invested in rebuilding or renovating the property to double its basis and qualify 
as substantially improved).  
 200. See id. (demonstrating how aggregating allows buildings to pass the 
substantial improvement test that otherwise would not have passed on an 
asset-by-asset basis).  
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While national-oriented frameworks can inform, improve, and 
provide a broad framework for investment strategies, the types of 
investors who are inclined to invest in Opportunity Zones are 
“generally inexperienced in working directly with local residents 
and leaders.”201 The December 2019 final regulations state that 
there “are no current or proposed plans to reopen consideration of 
additional census tracts to be designated as qualified Opportunity 
Zones.”202 Therefore, local governments should focus on regulating 
the types of projects that are being invested in and ensuring that 
they are the kinds of place-based investments that local 
communities need and will benefit from.203 
1. The Case in Maryland—Lighting the Way for Other States 
Some states—like Maryland—have proposed plans that create 
initiatives to attract investments that would meaningfully uplift 
the neighborhoods and struggling communities within 
Opportunity Zones.204 The Maryland Department of Commerce 
provides Maryland Opportunity Zone Enhancement Credits for 
businesses located in Maryland Opportunity Zones, along with job 
training programs, small business loans, and affordable housing 
 
 201. See Kate Gasparro & David Weinberger, How to Ensure Opportunity 
Zone Investments Strengthen Local Communities, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 
(Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_to_ensure_opportunity_zone_investments_str
engthen_local_communities (describing the importance of working with city, 
county, and state governments that have stepped into the role of intermediary, 
by vetting and prioritizing investments that make the most sense for their 
communities) [perma.cc/PW83-K6ND]. 
 202. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,941 
(Jan. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (answering commenters who 
requested that the determination process be reopened, so new qualified 
Opportunity Zones could be designated, by stating that section 1400Z-1 provides 
authority for one round of nominations and designations only). 
 203. See Gasparro & Weinberger, supra note 201 (providing examples of 
state-wide approaches such as building partnerships with higher education 
institutions for long-term change and working with organizations such as 
Accelerator for America, to “produce guidelines for community-minded 
investments”).  
 204. See Maryland Opportunity Zone Enhancement Credits, MD. DEP’T OF 
COM., https://commerce.maryland.gov/fund/programs-for-
businesses/opportunity-zone-enhancement-credits (outlining the various 
initiatives) [perma.cc/R63S-BSSP].  
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incentives.205 For example, in order to obtain the Jobs Creation Tax 
Credit, the business needs to create a minimum number of new 
permanent positions, ranging from ten to sixty, and pay at least 
120% of minimum wage within a twenty-four month period.206 
2. The Case in Colorado—Local Activism 
Boulder, Colorado is another example of local level activism.207 
An inundation of investments in Opportunity Zones in Boulder 
threatened to reshape neighborhoods and increase living costs for 
residents.208 The City Council responded with a short-term 
moratorium to stop the demolition of multifamily homes and the 
construction of non-residential buildings.209 The Council provided 
an “exception for any community-serving Colorado nonprofit 
corporation that presumably had a better understanding of what 
local people needed.”210 This type of local activism places 
community needs at the forefront and uses the Opportunity Zone 
program to prioritize the welfare of residents. 
At the time of this Note, there is no administrative guidance 
regarding who the businesses being funded by QOFs employ, 
whether housing in the zones remains affordable for residents, or 
 
 205. See id. (providing that if businesses satisfy authorizing conditions, they 
could be eligible for seven programs offering enhanced tax credits including Job 
Creation Tax Credit Enhanced Credits, One Maryland Tax Credit Enhanced 
Credits, More Jobs for Marylanders Income Tax Credit, Enterprise Zone and 
Enterprise Zone Focus Area Income Tax Credits). 
 206. See Job Creation Tax Credit (JCTC), MD. DEP’T OF COM., 
https://commerce.maryland.gov/fund/programs-for-businesses/job-creation-tax-
credit (establishing that the number of positions required depends on location and 
that the amount of the credit given depends on whether the facility is located 
within a revitalization area and that the total amount of credits allowable do have 
a ceiling at which they are capped) [perma.cc/YQX2-SSV7]. 
 207. See Gasparro & Weinberger, supra note 201 (reporting that local 
communities are not necessarily as active as in Boulder, and many states have 
other strategies for overseeing and managing Opportunity Zones). 
 208. Id.  
 209. See id. (stopping demolition of multifamily homes or construction of 
non-residential buildings and noting that the moratorium ensured city officials 
would discuss new policies and zoning regulations with local residents to ensure 
that changes brought about via Opportunity Zone investments would benefit the 
community). 
 210. Id. 
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whether job opportunities are being created and local economies 
revitalized. The most pointed critique of the program is that the 
Opportunity Zones are not actually helping the down-trodden 
communities they were intended to, and the funds are being 
funneled into projects and areas that would have received the 
investments anyway.211 As a consequence, the ones who are 
benefiting from the program are wealthy investors, and the 
low-income residents who can no longer afford living in the areas 
are displaced. 
D. Proposing Regulatory Change 
This Note proposes regulatory change that could benefit the 
intended beneficiaries of the Opportunity Zone regulations. In 
order to make the Opportunity Zone initiative more productive, it 
should adopt certain provisions from the NMTC and 
Empowerment Zone Programs. Rather than allowing investors to 
self-certify by filing Form 8996, investors and their proposed 
investments should be approved of by an entity similar to the CDFI 
Fund—dedicated solely to vetting, approving of, and ensuring that 
the investments are going toward a purpose that will lift the 
community in which the asset is placed. This entity should work 
closely with local governments to discern a community’s greatest 
needs and how the investments can benefit them. 
Further, in order to ensure that the legislation fulfills its 
intended purpose and goal, a regulation should be promulgated 
requiring that the businesses being created or expanded in 
Opportunity Zone tracts hire a certain percentage of employees 
from within that census tract. By hiring residents from within the 
Opportunity Zone, the legislation will directly impact those 
communities and assist in uplifting them by reducing 
displacement through job creation. 
For example, North Miami, Los Angeles, Manhattan, and New 
Orleans are all areas that are designated as Opportunity Zones, 
and the businesses being funded include luxury hotels and 
 
 211. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33 (“[B]illions of untaxed investment 
profits are beginning to pour into high-end apartment buildings and hotels, 
storage facilities that employ only a handful of workers, and student housing in 
bustling college towns . . . .”). 
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restaurants.212 This Note proposes that such businesses be 
mandated to hire 50% of their employees—those who are part of 
the day-to-day staff and who must be on site and engaged in 
running the businesses’ everyday affairs—from the population 
that resides within the census tract where the Opportunity Zone is 
located. Regulating this could foster an environment of economic 
opportunity, create thousands of new jobs, and revitalize 
communities and neighborhoods that need help the most.213 
Additionally, similar to the credit employees receive via 
Empowerment Zones, investors in Opportunity Zones could receive 
a credit in exchange for ensuring that their assets’ management 
hire locally.214 A credit of up to 10% of the first $15,000 in wages 
paid to each employee who lives and works in the community for 
up to ten years could incentivize investors to participate actively 
in the management of the businesses they are investing in and 
promote job creation. This will also prevent displacement that 
would have otherwise taken place, especially as a result of the 
Substantial Improvement Rule, if employees are residents who can 
afford to live in the designated zones.  
1. Arguments Against These Proposals 
While critics highlight examples of Opportunity Zones in 
affluent neighborhoods such as Manhattan and Miami, proponents 
of the program argue that the majority of Opportunity Zones 
appear to fit the intended demographic definition and are bringing 
investments to areas that would not otherwise receive them.215 
In his February 2020 State of the Union Address, President 
Trump stated that the Opportunity Zone initiative was one of his 
 
 212. See generally Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33 (reporting about the 
wealthy investors with political influence who are planning such luxury 
investments in contiguous zones that are not actually low-income themselves).  
 213. See Lorraine Mirabella, supra note 183 (describing the ways in which the 
Enhancement program in Maryland could be the most competitive in the country 
if these goals are met). 
 214. See generally Busso, Gregory & Kline, supra note 155 (discussing the 
origins of the Empowerment Zone status). 
 215. See Fikri & Lettieri, supra note 124, at 10 (“Press coverage often 
broadly—and mistakenly—applies notions of gentrification forged in New York 
or Washington, DC, to any discussion of community revitalization.”).  
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top achievements since taking office, and the White House has held 
that the “tax incentive for investors in blighted areas, which has 
come under fire from Democrats and activists, are not the reason 
that [B]lack residents of Charlotte and other urban areas are being 
displaced.”216 In response to arguments that Opportunity Zones 
provide for “urban renewal” or a way to address blight and crime, 
Corine Mack, president of the Charlotte chapter of the NAACP, 
asks why people are still impoverished and predominantly white 
people are reaping the wealth.217 
Proponents of the Opportunity Zone regulations could look at 
the current statistics and state that they are in fact doing exactly 
what they were intended. A total of 42,176 census tracts were 
eligible to be designated as Opportunity Zones.218 Of these, a total 
of 8,762 were designated, and of those, 8,532 were low-income 
communities, while 230 were in contiguous communities.219 
Moreover, a total of 31.3 million people across the United States 
live in areas that have been designated as Opportunity Zones.220 
These statistics may convey that Opportunity Zones seem to be 
well within the spirit of the policy; however, there are a small share 
of designations that do not raise legitimate concerns.221 
Furthermore, as discussed in Part II of this Note, the Median 
 
 216. See Francesca Chambers & Danielle Chemtob, White House Defends 
Opportunity Zones Ahead of Trump Visit to Charlotte, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER 
(Feb. 5, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article239946198.html (“The president’s push for the tax break 
comes amid local and national criticism that the wealthy and those connected to 
Trump are using the tax break to build high-end projects, rather than to help the 
poor.”) [perma.cc/WBT8-RABS].  
 217. See id. (reporting that “Rev. Willie Keaton Jr., a Charlotte activist, views 
the initiative as similar to urban renewal, a federal policy through which 
Charlotte demolished hundreds of homes, businesses and churches in what was 
the city’s largest [B]lack neighborhood . . . . Leaders promised to provide new 
housing for residents, but they never did”). 
 218. See Opportunity Zones:  How Communities Were Selected for 
Participation, MISSION INVS. EXCH. (Aug. 2018), 
https://missioninvestors.org/resources/opportunity-zones-how-communities-
were-selected-participation (providing characteristics of selected Opportunity 
Zones and factual information regarding their demographics) [perma.cc/JE2A-
U4Y8].  
 219. See id. (“Up to 5% of those nominated census tracts could be in areas that 
were contiguous with low-income community census tracts.”).  
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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Family Income data of zones may be skewed by large universities 
being encapsulated in the zone and large student populations 
distorting the true income levels in those areas.222 Additionally, the 
“outliers should not obscure the fundamental fact that 
Opportunity Zones are a cohort of places facing enormous 
socioeconomic challenges.”223 
While investments are indeed being made in the designated 
zones, they are not achieving the overarching goal and purpose the 
legislation was enacted for because primarily large investment 
companies and wealthy investors are benefitting.224 Without 
proper direction and an emphasis on prioritizing the distressed 
communities, paired with proper approval and regulation—which 
are currently lacking—the investments will further exacerbate the 
wealth and income disparities prevalent in these census tracts and 
throughout the country. “Investors are disconnected from the 
communities where they are placing money, with zero 
requirements to follow community leadership or in any way 
include communities in the planning and approval process.”225 
VI. Conclusion 
The United States leads the developed world when it comes to 
income and wealth inequality.226 Legislation like section 1400Z 
may continue to perpetuate this trend unless regulations on the 
 
 222. See Jacoby, supra note 30 (stating that large university student 
populations skew the MFI data of census tracts). 
 223. The State of Socioeconomic Need and Community Change in Opportunity 
Zones, ECON. INNOVATION GRP. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://eig.org/news/the-state-of-
socioeconomic-need-and-community-change-in-opportunity-zones 
[perma.cc/HZ3A-AKKQ]. 
 224. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 33 (“[L]eaders of groups that work in 
cities and rural areas to combat poverty say they are disappointed with how it is 
playing out so far. ‘Capital is going to flow to the lowest-risk, highest-return 
environment,’ said Aaron T. Seybert . . . .”). 
 225. See Morgan Simon, Opportunity Zones:  We’re Doing it Wrong, FORBES 
(Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/09/03/opportunity-zones-were-
doing-it-wrong/#165546db56fa (outlining three “dangerous” scenarios in which 
the mutual social benefits of Opportunity Zones may become, or already are, 
limited) [perma.cc/8XV4-Z2PX]. 
 226. See Alston, supra note 47, at 4 (reporting that policies enacted by this 
administration are perpetuating these inequalities). 
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types of investments are stricter and directed toward the true 
needs of distressed communities. If altered appropriately, such as 
along the lines of the suggestions proposed in this Note, the 
Opportunity Zone legislation could prove fruitful for both investors 
and residents of low-income census tracts. Meaningful 
investments could be made in the types of assets that the 
underserved communities need most. 
